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PRESERVING THE SANCTITY OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING: THE COMPENSABILITY OF TRAVEL
TIME FOLLOWING FLSA SECTION 203(o) DONNING
AND DOFFING ACTIVITY
Nicholas Hart+
Here was a population, low-class and mostly foreign, hanging always
on the verge of starvation, and dependent for its opportunities of life
upon the whim of men every bit as brutal and unscrupulous as the oldtime slave-drivers; under such circumstances immorality is exactly as
inevitable, and as prevalent, as it was under the system of chattel
slavery.1
The exploitation of early factory workers, so vividly depicted in Upton
Sinclair’s The Jungle,2 has been largely eradicated through the growth of the
regulatory state. For a select group of workers, however, inequities still remain
between the hours they work and the wages they receive. These workers are
required to report to work before their shift begins to change into uniforms or
protective clothing that usually includes flame retardant or sanitary clothing,3
steel-toed boots, 4 hard hats, 5 gloves, safety goggles, and earplugs. 6 The
employee then makes the trip to the factory floor, which may be a short walk
from the changing room or a bus trip across an industrial complex taking several
+
J.D., January 2014, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law; B.M., 2009,
University of Cincinnati. The author is grateful to Professor Benjamin Mintz for his valuable
comments and insight, and to Jake McDermott for his guidance when writing this Comment. He
would also like to thank his father, whose countless hours spent discussing the realities of collective
bargaining were invaluable in formulating the author’s ideas. Thanks are also due to Professor
Roger C. Hartley and the attorneys at Murphy Anderson PLLC for their comments and guidance
throughout the author’s writing process. Finally, the author gives his utmost gratitude to the staff
and editors of The Catholic University Law Review whose hard work was instrumental in the
publication of this Comment.
1. UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE 109 (1906).
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 592 (7th Cir. 2012) (considering
whether employee compensation is necessary for the time spent putting on flame retardant
clothing), aff’d 134 S. Ct. 870 (2014); Arnold v. Schreiber Foods, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 2d 672, 674
(M.D. Tenn. 2010) (examining compensation for the time spent putting on sanitary uniforms).
4. See, e.g., Sepulveda v. Allen Family Foods, Inc., 591 F.3d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 2009)
(requiring workers to change into clean and sanitized steel-toe boots at the work facility).
5. Sandifer, 678 F.3d at 592 (listing hard hats as part of the workers’ changing regimen);
Schreiber Foods, 690 F. Supp. 2d at 674 (noting that Schreiber Foods workers wear hard hats while
working on the production line).
6. Schreiber Foods, 690 F. Supp. 2d at 675 (explaining that employees put on safety goggles,
gloves, and a hairnet before leaving the changing area and entering their work stations).
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minutes.7 Once each employee arrives at his or her workstation, the employee
clocks in and the compensated workday begins.8
Unions, through negotiations with employers, may waive compensation for
the time spent donning and doffing via the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
Section 203(o) exclusion. 9 Added to the FLSA in 1949, 10 this provision
authorizes the time spent changing into work clothes11 by union employees to
be uncompensated.12 Should, however, the provision extend to mean that the
worker is also not entitled to compensation for post-donning and pre-doffing
time spent traveling from the changing room to the factory floor?
The Portal-to-Portal Act,13 which regulates the compensability of travel time
in the workplace, created two exemptions to the FLSA employee compensation
requirements.14 The first exemption excludes all time spent traveling to and
from the workplace from compensation.15 The second exemption covers time
spent performing tasks that are “preliminary or postliminary” to the employee’s

7. For example, U.S. Steel asserted in the District Court that it could take as many as eight
minutes for a worker to travel from the changing room to their work station. See Sandifer v. U.S.
Steel Corp., No. 2:07-CV-443 RM, 2009 WL 3430222 at *17 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 15, 2009). This
means that in U.S. Steel Corp.’s Gary, Indiana complex, some workers have been losing more
sixty-nine hours worth of wages for their travel time for every year they work. See id. at *1,
*16–18.
8. The industry refers to this as “line time,” which is a form of wage calculation that
measures the workday from the beginning to the end of production on the work line. See Sepulveda,
591 F.3d at 212.
9. Section 3(o) of the Fair Labor Standards Act provides:
In determining for the purposes of . . . this title the hours for which an employee is employed, there
shall be excluded any time spent in changing clothes or washing at the beginning or end of each
workday which was excluded from measured working time during the week involved by the express
terms of or by custom or practice under a bona fide collective-bargaining agreement applicable to
the particular employee.
29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2006).
10. See Act of Oct. 26, 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-393, 63 Stat. 910 (codified at
29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2006)).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 203(o). The exclusion also covers washing time. Id. However, for simplicity,
this Comment will focus solely on donning and doffing, otherwise called changing time, and not
time spent washing at the beginning or end of a workday.
12. The exclusion may be applied as a result of either the custom or practice of the bargaining
unit or the express language of a collective bargaining agreement. 29 U.S.C. § 203(o). The term
custom and practice is not meant to implicate “industry” standards.
See
29 C.F.R. § 790.10(d) (2013). Instead, “‘custom’ and ‘practice,’. . . may be said to be descriptive
generally of those situations where an employer, without being compelled to do so by an express
provision of a contract, has paid employees for certain activities performed.” 29 C.F.R.
§ 790.10(c).
13. The Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251, et seq. (2006)
14. The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) requires compensation for all productive work that
is performed by an employee on behalf of the employer. 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. (2006); see also
infra Part I (discussing the FLSA’s compensation rules).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1) (2006).
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job.16 As a result, compensation is required for all hours an employee works,
including time spent traveling between principal activities.17
In 2005, the Supreme Court held that the required donning and doffing of
work clothes may be a principal activity that triggers compensation for a
continuous workday.18 This ruling, however, left open the question of whether
the required donning and doffing of work clothes may still be considered a
principal activity triggering compensation for a continuous workday if the union
and employer exclude compensation under FLSA Section 203(o).19
Congress added Section 203(o) to the FLSA to preserve the “sanctity of
collective-bargaining agreements” after the passage of the Portal-to-Portal Act.20
Congress feared that because courts required compensation for all “principal”
activities, the Portal-to-Portal Act would undermine the highly unionized
industries that define the workday in collective bargaining agreements, resulting
instead in the very windfalls that the Portal-to-Portal Act was passed to
prevent. 21 Historically, Portal-to-Portal Act jurisprudence has sought to
determine whether the activity is principal in nature and thus compensable.22
16. This exemption only applies if the preliminary or postliminary activities take place before
the performance of the first and after the performance of the final principal activity of the
employee’s workday. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(2). The Code of Federal Regulations defines a
preliminary activity is any “activity engaged in by an employee before the commencement of his
‘principal’ activity or activities.” 29 C.F.R. § 790.7(b) (2013). A postliminary activity is defined
as one “engaged in by an employee after the completion of his ‘principal’ activity or activities.”
Id. Although there is no definitive list of these exempted activities, the regulations specifically
mention “[w]alking, riding, or traveling to or from the actual place of performance of the principal
activity or activities which (the) employee is employed to perform.” Id. However, travel time that
is performed during the course of the employee’s principal job duties is not the type of activity
exempted by the Portal-to-Portal Act. Id. at § 790.7(d).
17. This is known as the continuous workday rule. See 29 C.F.R. § 790.6(a). The regulation
establishing this rule states, in part:
Under the provisions of section 4, one of the conditions that must be present before
“preliminary” or “postliminary” activities are excluded from hours worked is that they
“occur either prior to the time on any particular workday at which the employee
commences, or subsequent to the time on any particular workday at which he ceases” the
principal activity or activities which he is employed to perform.
Id.; see also infra Part I.B (discussing the continuous workday rule in greater depth).
18. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 29–30 (2005).
19. Most recently, the Supreme Court refused to hear the question of whether travel time
following and preceding excluded changing and washing activities is compensable. See Sandifer
v. U.S. Steel Petition for Certiorari, Granted in Part, Denied in Part, 133 S. Ct. 1240, 2013 WL
598470 (2013). Instead, the court only decided the issue of the definition of clothes under Section
203(o). Sandifer v. U.S. Steel, 134 S. Ct. 870 (2014) (finding that, for the purposes of the statute,
“clothes” will be given its ordinary meaning of articles of clothing that cover the body).
20. See, e.g., 95 CONG. REC. 11210 (1949) (statement of Rep. Christian Herter); see also infra
Part II.
21. 29 U.S.C. § 251(a)(4).
22. See, e.g., Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 252–53 (1956) (establishing that the donning
and doffing of work clothes may be a principal activity when that activity is “integral and
indispensible” to the employee’s job); Mitchell v. King Packing Co., 350 U.S. 260, 261–63 (1956)
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Courts, however, have not examined whether compensation is a prerequisite for
principal activity status.23 As a result of these competing principles, there is an
emerging split in authority when determining whether the required donning and
doffing of work clothes is a principal activity if it is not compensated because of
a valid Section 203(o) exclusion.24
Part I of this Comment explores the prior law and sets forth the current
framework for determining the compensability of work. It then examines the
emerging authoritative split in interpreting the principal nature of work
performed under a Section 203(o) exclusion. Part II demonstrates that this
authoritative split is damaging to the effective implementation of the Section
203(o) exclusion and calls for a resolution to this split. Part III seeks to resolve
the current inconsistencies of Section 203(o) jurisprudence by creating a new
standard asserting that under the Section 203(o) exclusion, donning and doffing
is a per se principal activity that triggers compensation for the continuous
workday. Because Section 203(o) is at its core a collective bargaining provision,
the final part of this Comment analyzes the proposed standard in the context of
the current collective bargaining regime.
I. WHEN IS WORK WORK?
Before determining whether an activity is principal for the purposes of the
Portal-to-Portal Act, the activity must first qualify as “work.”25 Therefore, a
brief overview of the FLSA, the Portal-to-Portal Act, the continuous workday
rule, and Section 203(o) is required.

(finding that the sharpening of knives by meat cutters is “an integral part of and indispensible to”
the employee’s job and thus compensable under the FLSA).
23. The test for determining principal activity status is whether the activity is “integral and
indispensible” to the employee’s principal job duties, not whether the activity is compensated. See
Steiner, 350 U.S. at 252–53 (1956) (affirming the Court of Appeals’s determination that activities
that are “an integral and indispensible part of the principal activities” may not be exempted by the
Portal-to-Portal Act).
24. See Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 595–96 (7th Cir. 2012) (concluding that
since the Section 203(o) donning and doffing activity was uncompensated, it could not be a
principal activity triggering compensation for the travel time as part of the continuous workday),
aff’d on other grounds 134 S. Ct. 870 (2014); Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 619–20 (6th
Cir. 2010) (holding that Section 203(o) activity was integral and indispensible and thus a principal
activity triggering compensation for the travel time under a continuous workday).
25. The FLSA defines “employ” as “includ[ing] to suffer or permit to work.”
29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2006). This definition has been interpreted to mean any work that is performed
primarily for the benefit of the employer. See, e.g., Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S.
148, 152 (1947) (holding that the trainees of a railroad were not employed by the railroad while in
still
in
school
because
“[the
Act’s]
definitions
of
‘employ’
and
of
‘employee’ . . . cannot be interpreted so as to make a person whose work serves only his own
interest an employee of another person who gives him aid and instruction” because the definitions
accomplish the purpose of the Act, which was, “as to wages . . . to insure that every person whose
employment contemplated compensation should not be compelled to sell his services for less than
the prescribed minimum wage”).
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A. The Fair Labor Standards Act: To Suffer or Permit to Work
Congress enacted the FLSA in 1938 as a response to substandard wages and
as a means to ensure that all employees receive “[a] fair day’s pay for a fair day’s
work.”26 The statute provides:
Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any
workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in
the production of goods for commerce, wages [equal to or greater than
the minimum wage].27
To “employ” a worker means “to suffer or permit to work,” but the statutory
definition leaves significant room for judicial interpretation.28 “Work” has been
defined in multiple ways. The most common definition is “physical or mental
exertion (whether burdensome or not) controlled or required by the employer
and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer.”29 In
1944, the Supreme Court expanded this broad definition to include
nonexertional acts, asserting that an employee may be hired to wait for
productive work to arise, or even be hired to do nothing at all.30 The Court later
affirmed this expansive reading of “work,” holding that the FLSA’s
requirements “are to be ‘narrowly construed against . . . employers’ and are to
be withheld except as to persons ‘plainly and unmistakably within their terms
and spirit.’”31
B. The Portal-to-Portal Act: Exempting Preliminary and Postliminary
Activities from Work Time
In a series of a cases in the 1940s, the Supreme Court added to the definition
of “work” by holding that time spent walking from a factory’s entryway to the

26. Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 578 (1942) (quoting 81 CONG.
REC. 4983 (1937) (statement of President Franklin D. Roosevelt)), superseded by statute,
Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 251 et seq. (2006).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (2006 & 2012). The current federal minimum wage of $7.25 an hour
is a floor; states may enact minimum wages greater than the federal mandate.
29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1). The Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division catalogs current State
minimum wage rates. See Minimum Wage Laws in the States, DEPT. OF LABOR WAGE AND HOUR
DIV. (Jan. 1, 2013), http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/america.htm#.UJrwSKmg1UQ. In addition
to minimum wage regulations, the FLSA also requires overtime wages, equal to 150 percent of the
employee’s hourly wage, for all work beyond eight hours in a day or forty hours in a work-week.
29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)(2006).
28. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(g).
29. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598 (1944),
superseded by statute, Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 251 et seq. (2006).
30. Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 133 (1944).
31. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997) (quoting Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361
U.S. 388, 392 (1960)).
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employee’s workstation is compensable under the FLSA. 32 This expansion
triggered a legislative response that came to be known as the Portal-to-Portal
Act.33 The Portal-to-Portal Act exempts certain activities from compensable
time. These exemptions include travel to and from, but not within, the
workplace and activities that occur at the workplace but happen before or after
an employee is engaged in their principal work activities.34
Although both of the statutory exceptions use the phrase “principal activity,”
neither the statute nor the Department of Labor’s regulations clearly define what
constitutes a principal activity.35 The Supreme Court , however, has thoroughly
examined the definition of “preliminary and postliminary” activities.36
In Steiner v. Mitchell, the first Supreme Court case examining the
Portal-to-Portal Act, the majority held that “preliminary and postliminary”
activities are those activities that are “an integral and indispensable part of the
principal activities.”37
In confusing circularity, this “integral and indispensable” holding establishes
an exception to the Portal-to-Portal Act exemptions: if the performance of an
otherwise preliminary or postliminary activity is “an integral and indispensable
part” of a worker’s principal activity, the worker must be paid for it under the
FLSA, even if the Portal-to-Portal Act would otherwise exempt the activity from
compensation.38 This universally accepted reading of the Portal-to-Portal Act is
critically important because Department of Labor regulations state that donning

32. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 690–91 (1946) (holding that when
an employee is required to be physically present at the employer’s workplace, “on duty or at a
prescribed workplace,” the time spent on the premises shall be compensated), superseded by
statute, Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 251 et seq.; Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167,
United Mine Workers of Am., 325 U.S. 161, 163 (1945) (holding that workers must be
compensated for the time spent traveling between a bituminous mine’s portal and the working face),
superseded by statute, Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 251 et seq.; Tenn. Coal, Iron
& R.R. Co., 321 U.S. at 603 (holding that workers must be compensated for the time spent traveling
between an iron ore mine’s portal and the employee’s work site).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 251 et seq. This Act was a congressional effort to limit judiciary overreach.
Congress found that courts had been interpreting the FLSA “in disregard of long-established
customs, practices, and contracts between employers and employees,” which imposed on
employers the potential for immensely burdensome liabilities and financial uncertainty so as to
freeze development and growth in the industry, create economic imbalances between industries,
and difficulty engaging in voluntary collective bargaining. 29 U.S.C. § 251(a) (2006).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a) (2006 & 2012).
35. The statute is silent on the definition of principal activities. See 29 U.S.C. § 262 (defining
employee, employer, wage, Walsh-Healey Act, Davis-Bacon Act, and state, but not principal
activity). The Department of Labor, however, through its rulemaking authority, defines “principal
activities” as those “which the employee is ‘employed to perform.’”
29 C.F.R.
§ 790.8(a) (2013). This term includes “all activities which are an integral part of a principal
activity.” 29 C.F.R. § 790.8(b) (2013).
36. See Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 256 (1956).
37. Id.
38. Id.
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and doffing protective gear may be “integral and indispensable” in certain
situations.39
1. The “Continuous Workday” Rule: Compensation is Required for All
Time Spent Between Principal Activities
Compensation for a workday is based on a principle known as the continuous
workday rule.40 A “workday” is “the period between the commencement and
completion on the same workday of an employee’s principal activity or
activities.”41 Through this definition of “workday,” the Department of Labor has
created an additional exception to the Portal-to-Portal Act exemptions.42
This exception requires employers to compensate employees for activities
occurring between the performance of the employee’s first and final “principal
activity” of the day, even when the Portal-to-Portal Act would expressly provide
otherwise.43 However, the Supreme Court has expansively interpreted the scope
of “principal activities” to include “any activity that is ‘integral and
indispensable’ to a ‘principal activity.’”44 Thus, even activities not typically
considered “principal activities” can begin the workday if they are “integral and
indispensable” to a principal activity.45 Therefore, employers must compensate
workers for all working time accrued subsequent to the initial activity until the
employee completes his final principal activity of the workday, even if parts of
those hours would not be compensable under the Portal-to-Portal Act
exemptions.46

39. Specifically, the regulation states:
If an employee in a chemical plant, for example, cannot perform his principal activities
without putting on certain clothes, changing clothes on the employer’s premises at the
beginning and end of the workday would be an integral part of the employee’s principal
activity. On the other hand, if changing clothes is merely a convenience to the employee
and not directly related to his principal activities, it would be considered as a
‘preliminary’ or ‘postliminary’ activity rather than a principal part of the activity.
29 C.F.R. § 790.8(c).
40. 29 C.F.R. § 790.6; see also IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 42 (2005) (holding activities
performed between the first and last principal activities of the workday are compensable as part of
the “continuous workday”).
41. 29 C.F.R. § 790.6(b).
42. Id. at § 790.6(a). The regulation states:
[T]o the extent that activities engaged in by an employee occur after the employee
commences to perform the principal activity on a particular workday and before he ceases
the performance of the last principal activity on a particular workday, the provisions of
[Section 4 of the Portal-to-Portal Act] have no application.
Id.
43. Id.
44. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 37 (2005).
45. Id.; 29 C.F.R. § 790.6.
46. 29 C.F.R. § 790.6.
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The courts have consistently held that the donning and doffing of work clothes
may be a integral and indispensable part of a worker’s principal workday.47 The
inquiry, however, is fact-dependent.48 Most recently, in IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez the
Supreme Court, “conclude[d] that the locker rooms where . . . donning and
doffing took place are the relevant ‘place of performance’ of the principal
activity,” thus triggering compensation for a continuous workday.49
C. The Section 203(o) Exclusion for Donning and Doffing by Union
Employees
With this reasoning in mind, Congress amended the FLSA in 1947 to allow
unions and employers to exempt the time spent donning or doffing work clothes
from compensable time. 50 When considering the exclusion, Congress
determined that deference to the terms of a “bona fide collective-bargaining
agreement” is more in the FLSA’s spirit of protecting the interests of covered
workers than strict, categorical adherence to a poorly-crafted, imprecise
mandate.51
These exclusions, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 203(o), are valid as long as two
conditions are met. 52 First, the donning and doffing must be considered
“changing clothes.” 53 Second, compensation for this time must be waived
47. See, e.g., Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 37 (holding that the donning and doffing of work clothes
may be a principal activity for the purposes of the Portal-to-Portal Act); Steiner, 350 U.S. 247, 256
(1956) (concludig that donning and doffing is a principal activity if it is integral and indispensible
to the employee’s job).
48. See, e.g., Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., No. CT-98-5005-RHW, 2001 WL 34897841 at *11–14
(E.D. Wash. Sep. 14, 2001) (considering the type of clothing and protective equipment, the amount
of time it took the employees to don and doff the clothing and protective equipment, and the
employer’s reasons for requiring employees to wear the clothing and protective equipment as
factors in examining the principal nature of the donning and doffing activity), aff’d in part, rev’d
in part, Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 339 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2003), aff’d IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21
(2005).
49. Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 34 (holding that the donning and doffing of work clothes is a principal
activity which in turn requires compensation for the time walking between the changing station and
work station).
50. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949, Pub. L. No. 49-393, 63 Stat. 910 (codified at
29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2006)).
51. See 95 CONG. REC. 11210 (1949) (statement of Rep. Christian Herter) (explaining that
section 203(o) was enacted to avoid the situation where the Department of Labor deems illegitimate
a previously agreed up collective bargaining agreement that specified that no compensation would
be paid for donning or doffing of work clothes, thereby forcing employers to retrospectively
determine the back pay owed to employees for these activities).
52. Sepulveda v. Allen Family Foods, Inc., 591 F.3d 209, 214 (4th Cir. 2009).
53. Id. There has long been a controversy over the definition of work clothes. See, e.g.,
Kimberly D. Krone, And You Don’t Get Paid for That: Section 203(o) of the Fair Labor Standards
Act Does Not Apply to Donning and Doffing of Safety Gear, 9 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 35, 67–72
(2012) (arguing that the donning and doffing of safety gear is a principal activity and that the
exclusion should only be applied to changing in and out of “regular work clothing”); James Watts,
Comment, Dressing for Work Is Work: Compensating Employees Under the Fair Labor Standards
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through express contractual language or by the custom or practice 54 of the
employer and bargaining unit.55
As the Supreme Court has stated, the exclusion’s “clear implication is that
clothes changing and washing, which are otherwise a part of the principal
activity [for the purposes of Portal-to-Portal Act exemptions], may be expressly
excluded from coverage by agreement.”56 Thus, even if donning and doffing is
“integral and indispensible” and, as a result, compensable under the Portal-toPortal Act, an employer and union may still “opt out” by excluding the time from
compensation under their collective-bargaining agreement or through custom or
practice.57 The inquiry remains as to whether, after an employer and a union
apply the exclusion, the donning and doffing, which would otherwise be
principal in nature, may retain that status and trigger compensation under a
continuous workday.
D. The Emerging Authoritative Split Regarding the Principal Nature of
Changing Time Under Section 203(o) exclusions
Federal courts and the Department of Labor have split, both internally and
with each other, when deciding the nature of travel time following activity
excluded under Section 203(o). This split has resulted in two predominant tests
for determining the compensability of travel time following excluded donning
and doffing. The first standard, adopted by the Sixth Circuit in Franklin v.
Kellogg Co., employs a traditional FLSA analysis to determine whether the
excluded activity preceding or following the travel time is principal in nature
and thus triggers compensation for that travel time.58 In contrast, the Seventh
Circuit applies a conflicting standard that all activities excluded under Section
Act for Donning and Doffing Protective Gear, 87 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 297, 298 (2010)
(highlighting the current authoritative split between the Tenth, Third, Ninth, and Second Circuits
over what types of clothing may be excluded under Section 203(o)). This conflict, however, has
since been resolved in Sandifer v. U.S. Steel, where the court defined work clothes under Section
203(o) as “items that are both designed and used to cover the body and are commonly regarded as
articles of dress.” 134 S.Ct. 870, 876 (2014).
This comment, however, focuses only on the travel time following those instances in which the
donning and doffing is an activity that is properly excluded under Section 203(o).
55. Sepulveda, 591 F.3d at 214. For further discussion of when compensation is waived by
custom or practice, see Turner v. City of Phila., 262 F.3d 222, 226 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that
custom or practice is a restatement of “the well-established principle of labor law that a particular
custom or practice can become an implied term of a labor agreement through a prolonged period
of acquiescence”).
56. Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 257, 255 (1956).
57. See Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 131 (1994) (describing Section 203(o) as an “opt
out” provision).
58. Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 607–08 (6th Cir. 2010); see also DEPT. OF LABOR,
WAGE AND HOUR DIV., Administrator’s Interpretation No. 2010-2, at 1 (June 16, 2010), available
at http://www.dol.gov/WHD/opinion/adminIntrprtn/FLSA/2010/FLSAAI2010_2.pdf (finding that
travel time following excluding donning and doffing activity may be a compensable integral and
indispensible activity of the principal workday).
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203(o) are not principal in nature, and therefore prohibits compensation for the
travel time.59 This split has resulted in a growing analytical conflict where on
the one hand, courts embark on a fact-intensive examination of the excluded
activity while on the other hand, courts disregard that excluded activity.
1. The Kellogg Test: Individual Analysis of the Excluded Activity
In Franklin v. Kellogg Co., workers at Kellogg’s Tennessee plant brought suit
seeking back pay for time spent donning and doffing mandatory protective
clothing and the time spent traveling between the work line and the changing
rooms at the beginning of their shifts, for their work breaks, and at the end of
their shifts. 60 The district court granted Kellogg’s motion for summary
judgment, holding that compensation for time spent donning and doffing was
excluded under Section 203(o).61 The district court also found that workers are
not entitled to compensation for the time spent traveling between the work line
and the changing rooms following activity excluded by Section 203(o).62
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that
compensation for the time spent donning and doffing was excluded under
Section 203(o).63 However, the court implied that the post-donning and predoffing time spent traveling between the changing room and work line was
compensable depending on the amount of time spent traveling.64 In determining
whether the donning and doffing was a principal activity despite the Section
203(o) exclusion, the court employed the long-established test for principal
activities—whether the excluded activity is “integral and indispensible” to the
employee’s performance of his job duties. 65 The Sixth Circuit, without
providing further analysis, assumed that because the changing time would be
considered principal without the exclusion, it must be considered principal when
the exclusion is applied.66

59. See Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 598 (7th Cir. 2012), aff’d 134 S. Ct. 870
(2014); see also DEPT. OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR DIV., Opinion Letter, FLSA2007-10, at 1
(May 14, 2007), available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/FLSA/2007/2007_05
_14_10_FLSA.pdf.pdf (finding that activities excluded by Section 203(o) is not principal in nature
and therefore cannot trigger compensation for the continuous workday).
60. Kellogg, 619 F.3d at 607–08.
61. Franklin v. Kellogg Co., No. 08-2268-JPM-TMP, 2009 WL 6093442, at *12 (W.D. Tenn.
July 20, 2009), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604 (6th Cir. 2010).
62. See id. at 9 (granting Skidmore deference to the DOL’s determination that walking time
following Section 203(o) donning and doffing activity is not compensable).
63. Franklin, 619 F.3d at 618.
64. Id. at 620.
65. Id. at 618–20.
66. Id.
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2. The Sandifer Test: If the Activity is Uncompensated, it Cannot be
Principal in Nature
The Seventh Circuit has come to the opposite conclusion of the Sixth
Circuit.67 Steelworkers at U.S. Steel’s Gary, Indiana campus sued to recover
back pay and lost wages for time spent changing and washing and traveling
between the changing room and the factory floor at the complex.68 The district
court found that compensation for the changing time was properly excluded
under Section 203(o).69 However, the court certified for interlocutory appeal the
issue of whether a Section 203(o) activity that is excluded from compensation,
and that would otherwise be principal in nature, could trigger compensation for
a continuous workday and result in compensation for the Gary plant’s
employees.70
The Seventh Circuit found that the travel time between the locker room and
the employees’ workstation was not compensable per the Portal-to-Portal Act
exemptions.71 Writing for the court, Judge Posner found that the time spent
donning and doffing could not be a principal activity because it was not
compensated.72 However, this position creates a problem for future application
of the holding. Whether compensation is due for a principal activity is a
determination made as part of the analysis; it is not a requirement. 73 If an
activity must be compensated to be principal in nature, then how could any
wrongfully uncompensated activity ever pass the muster of decades of Portalto-Portal Act jurisprudence?

67. See Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 598 (7th Cir. 2012), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 870
(2014).
68. Id. at 591.
69. Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., No. 2:07-CV-443RM, 2009 WL3430222, at *10 (N.D. Ind.
Oct. 15, 2009).
70. Sandifer, 678 F.3d at 592. As certified for appeal, the issue was “[w]hether, where it has
been determined that the activities of donning, doffing, and washing are not to be included in
compensable hours of work by operation of 29 U.S.C. 203(o), such activities can nonetheless start
the continuous workday under 29 U.S.C. 254(a).” Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, Sandifer v. U.S. Steel, 678 F.3d 590
(7th Cir. 2012) (Nos. 10-1821, 10-1866).
71. Sandifer, 678 F.3d at 596.
72. Id. at 596–97. The Seventh Circuit held:
Section 203(o) permits the parties to a collective bargaining agreement to reclassify
changing time as nonworking time, and they did so, agreeing that the workday would not
start when the workers changed their clothes; it would start when they arrived at their
work site. If clothes-changing time is lawfully not compensated, we can’t see how it
could be thought a principal employment activity, and so Section 254(a) exempts the
travel time in this case.
Id.
73. See Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 256 (1956).
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3. District Court Uncertainty: No Consistent Standard
The district courts have been faced with multiple donning and doffing lawsuits
in recent years.74 But absent a concrete standard from higher courts, they have
failed to synthesize a concrete rule for the principal nature of changing activities
under a valid compensation exclusion. Some courts have used an analysis
similar to the Kellogg test, 75 while others followed the Seventh Circuit by
applying the Sandifer standard. 76 These inconsistent holdings have only
contributed to the growing divide in Section 3(o) authority. Nothing, however,
has exacerbated the conflict to a greater degree than the Department of Labor’s
(DOL) inconsistent interpretation of the nature of donning and doffing excluded
by Section 203(o).
4. Administrative Uncertainty: The DOL’s Internal Split
The DOL has created a deeply entrenched, and in some aspects political, split
with their internal interpretation of the meaning of Section 3(o) and the nature
of activities excluded under the provision.77 With each change of the controlling
party in the Executive Branch, the DOL has changed its interpretation.78 During
74. See, e.g., McDonald v. Kellogg Co., 740 F. Supp. (D. Kan. Sept. 16, 2010), vacated in
part on reconsideration, McDonald v. Kellogg Co., No. 08-2473-JWL, 2010 WL 4386899 (D. Kan.
Oct. 29, 2010); Hudson v. Butterball, No. 08-5071-CV-SW-RED, 2009 WL 3486780 (W.D. Mo.
Oct. 14, 2009);
75. See, e.g., McDonald, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 1220 (determining that time spent changing
clothes is excluded from the total amount of compensated work hours); In re Tyson Foods, Inc.,
694 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1367 (M.D. Ga. 2010) (holding that donning and doffing protective gear is
changing clothes under Section 203(o)); Arnold v. Schreiber Foods, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 2d 672, 682
(M.D. Tenn. 2010) (holding that an employer need not compensate an employee for the time spent
donning and doffing required protective clothes); Andrako v. United States Steel Corp., 632 F.
Supp. 2d 398, 410 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (holding that the plaintiff was properly denied compensation
for donning and doffing of protective gear because the gear constituted clothes within the meaning
of a collective bargaining agreement denying compensation for changing clothes); Gatewood v.
Koch Foods of Mississippi, LLC, 569 F. Supp. 2d 687, 702 (S.D. Miss. 2008) (denying employees
compensation for donning and doffing clothing per a relevant collective bargaining agreement
under Section 203(o)).
76. See, e.g., Salazar v. Butterball, No. 08-cv-02071MSK-CBS, 2009 WL 6048979, at *15
(D. Colo. Dec. 3, 2009) (explaining that time spent donning and doffing protective clothing is not
compensable because it is not “work”); Hudson v. Butterball, No. 08-5071-CV-SW-RED, 2009
WL 3486780, *6 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 14, 2009) (holding that “time spent sanitizing, donning, doffing,
and walking is excluded from the definition of hours worked in 29 U.S.C. § 203(o)”); Sisk v. Sara
Lee Corp., 590 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1010 (W.D. Tenn. 2008) (holding that plaintiffs may not be
compensated for donning or doffing required protective gear under Section 203(o)); Collins v.
Sanderson Farms, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 2d 714, 724 (E.D. La. 2008) (explaining that time spent
changing into or out of clothes required for work is not compensable under Section 203(o)).
77. See infra notes 77–80.
78. See, e.g., DEPT. OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR DIV., Opinion Letter, FLSA2007-10, at 1
(May 14, 2007), available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/FLSA/2007/2007_05
_14_10_FLSA.pdf.pdf (asserting, under the Bush Administration, that the DOL believed changing
time not compensated under Section 3(o) is not a principal activity under the Portal-to-Portal Act);
DEPT. OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR DIV., Administrator’s Interpretation No. 2010-2, at 1 (June
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the Bush Administration, the Wage and Hour Division of the DOL determined
that work time performed under a valid Section 203(o) exclusion could not be
considered a principal activity.79 The Division stated that under Section 203(o),
certain activities excluded from compensation by an applicable collective
bargaining agreement, such as the donning and doffing work clothes, are not
principal activities, and therefore cannot begin the workday. Furthermore, the
Division found that since the excluded activities were not principal in nature,
walking time subsequent to excluded donning and doffing could not be a
compensable integral and indispensable part of the workday.80
In contrast, in 2009, the new Executive Administration changed this position
and held that Section 203(o) activities can be principal in nature.81 In doing so,
the Department of Labor stated that “the character of donning and doffing
activities is not dependent upon whether such activities are excluded pursuant to
a collective-bargaining agreement,” and thus activities occurring after donning
clothing were within the workday and may be compensable as such under the
Portal-to-Portal Act.82
The Department of Labor’s fickle interpretations have led to hesitation by the
courts in adopting any standard. 83 As demonstrated, the ever-growing
authoritative split has resulted in a clear divide in the courts and the executive
16,
2010), available
at
http://www.dol.gov/WHD/opinion/adminIntrprtn/FLSA/2010/
FLSAAI2010_2.pdf (asserting, under the Obama administration, that changing time not
compensated under Section 3(o) can be a principal activity under the Portal-to-Portal Act).
79. DEPT. OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR DIV., Opinion Letter FLSA2007-10, at 1 (May 14,
2007), available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/opinion/FLSA/2007/2007_05_14_10_FLSA.pdf.pdf.
80. Id. at 1. The Division stated:
Section 3(o) of the FLSA excludes “any time spent in changing clothes or washing at the
beginning or end of each workday which was excluded from measured working time
during the week involved by the express terms of or by custom or practice under a bona
fide collective-bargaining agreement applicable to the particular employee.” In
promulgating this provision Congress plainly excluded activities covered by Section 3(o)
from time that would otherwise be “[h]ours worked.” Accordingly, activities covered by
Section 3(o) cannot be considered principal activities and do not start the workday.
Walking time after a 3(o) activity is therefore not compensable unless it is preceded by a
principal activity. Id.
81. DEPT. OF LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR DIV., Administrator’s Interpretation No. 2010-2, at
(June 16, 2010), available at http://www.dol.gov/WHD/opinion/adminIntrprtn/FLSA/2010/FLS
AAI2010_2.pdf.
82. Id. at 4 (quoting Figas v. Horsehead Corp., 2008 WL 4170043 (W.D. Pa. 2008)).
83. See Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 599 (7th Cir. 2012), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 870
(2014).
Judge Posner rejected the DOL’s interpretation of the principal nature of
Section 203(o) activity, commenting that its fickle nature makes the Department of Labor’s position
appear as little more than political posturing to change along with each administration. Id. (stating
that
It would be a considerable paradox if before 2001 the plaintiffs would win because the
President was a Democrat, between 2001 and 2009 the defendant would win because the
President was a Republican, and in 2012 the plaintiffs would win because the President
is again a Democrat. That would make a travesty of the principle of deference. . . .
Id.
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agencies. This split has created uncertainty about the compensability of travel
time following donning and doffing activity excluded under Section 203(o). It
has also produced two standards of analysis that ignore crucial legislative intent
and the negative effects the standards may have on collective bargaining.
II. NO USABLE STANDARD: THE ENDURING CONFLICT BETWEEN SECTION
203(O) AND THE PORTAL-TO-PORTAL ACT
A. The Kellogg Test: Right Result, Wrong Process
The Sixth Circuit applied a traditional Portal-to-Portal Act analysis for
Section 203(o) activity.84 In its analysis, the court first determined whether a
Section 203(o) exclusion is valid, and then examined whether the excluded
donning and doffing is “integral and indispensible” to the performance of the
employee’s job duties.85 If the activity is integral and indispensible, then the
Section 203(o) activity is a principal activity that triggers compensation for
travel time under the continuous workday rule.86 Unlike the Sandifer test, the
Sixth Circuit’s analysis fits neatly into past Portal-to-Portal Act jurisprudence.87
The legislative history of Section 203(o) partially supports the Kellogg
approach. In the floor debate accompanying the passage of the exclusion, the
sponsor of the amendments noted that some collective bargaining agreements
exempted changing clothes from compensation while others did not, and
explained that in either case the decision was made carefully and “apparently
both [the employers and employees] are completely satisfied with respect to
their bargaining agreements.”88 The legislative history demonstrates that the
Section 203(o) exclusion was designed to preserve the “sanctity of collective
bargaining agreements” that exclude from compensation payment for the
donning and doffing of work clothes.89 This intent is properly incorporated in
Kellogg.
There are two major approaches to statutory interpretation and the role of
legislative intent in that construction. Both of these models support the resulting
Kellogg standard. One of these approaches, commonly known as formalism,
proposes that a plain reading of the text and structure of a statute present the

84. See Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 615–16 (6th Cir. 2010).
85. Id. at 619 (predicating compensation under Section 203(o) for donning or doffing on
whether the activity “is integral and indispensable” to the employee’s job and not on whether the
activity is a principal activity).
86. Id. at 618-20 (examining initially whether the activity can be principal in nature, and then
whether the activity is “integral and indispensible under the FLSA”).
87. See Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 256 (1956); see also supra Part I.B (discussing the
Portal-to-Portal Act analysis currently employed by courts).
88. 95 CONG. REC. 11210 (1949) (statement of Rep. Christian Herter).
89. Id.
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outer limits of a court’s interpretation of the scope of that statute.90 Applying a
plain text reading to the exclusion gets a clear result. The text of the exclusion
takes away compensation for otherwise compensable changing clothes and
washing time.91 Nowhere in the text is there any mention of altering the nature
of the activity. Therefore, a plain text reading of Section 203(o) shows that it
should not be interpreted to alter the nature of donning and doffing. Instead,
under this formalist approach, courts should limit the reading of Section 203(o)
to removing the specified activities from compensation. As a result, a formalist
reading of the exclusion supports the Kellogg standard.
In contrast to formalism, legal realists seek to interpret a statute by applying
the legislators’ intent through examining legislative purpose and applying
“interpretative principles.”92 Some of these principles include evaluating the
intent and the then interpreting the statute through the lens of that intent as well
as “constitutional norms” and “institutional concerns” in a way that mends
“statutory failure in the regulatory state.” 93 Applying these interpretive
principles from the realism model, an examination of Section 203(o) should be
read to: (1) protect the weaker party, which in this case is the workers;94 (2)
create a uniform application of FLSA principles; 95 and (3) ensure that the
application of the exclusion is fair and just.96

90. Formalism is premised on a distrust of the political nature of legislative history and
therefore chooses to rely solely on the text of the statute. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491
U.S. 1, 30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining that the role of the Court is to “give fair and
reasonable meaning to the text of the United States Code,” and “not to enter the minds of the
Members of Congress—who need have nothing in mind in order for their votes to be both lawful
and effective”); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 61 (1988) (“Original meaning is derived from words and structure,
and perhaps from identifying the sort of problem the legislature was trying to address. . . . Meaning
comes from the ring the words would have had to a skilled user of words at the time, thinking about
the same problem.”); William N. Eskridge Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 690
(1990) (“The new textualists are right in pointing legal scholars toward the process of evolution,
and away from a focus on the original discussions. Hence, as Justice Scalia asserts, the legislative
history discussion ought not be central to the interpretive enterprise . . .”).
91. 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2006 & 2012).
92. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV.
405, 454–76 (1989); see also Brian Leiter, In Praise of Realism (And Against “Nonsense”
Jurisprudence”), 100 GEO. L.J. 865, 893 (2012) (“Praise for Realism is praise for clarity about
what really happens, since what really happens is the very stuff on which instrumental reasoning
— reasoning about how to achieve what we already want, prefer, or value—operates.”); Thomas J.
Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 850 (2008) (explaining
that the need for the legal system to function justly and quickly supersedes the need for a
comprehensive understanding of each minute term, and thus “[l]egal academics and the lawyers
they train must often make normative evaluations of legal rules and institutions on the basis of only
partial information”).
93. See Sunstein, supra note 92, at 454–76.
94. Id. at 477.
95. Id. at 479.
96. Id. at 482.
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Applying these principles lends further support to the Kellogg standard and
discredits the Sandifer standard. The Sixth Circuit’s approach in Kellogg gives
greater protection to the employees by requiring the employer to prove that both
the excluded activity and subsequent travel time is not compensable, results in a
uniform application by limiting exemptions and expanding minimum standards,
and is fair because it limits the scope of the exclusion.97 The Sandifer standard
does just the opposite as it takes away the protection of minimum standards to
this class of employees, creates inconsistencies by expanding the exclusions
from FLSA coverage, and is unfair because it penalizes workers that choose to
use the exclusion and bargain away compensation for changing and washing
time. 98 Thus, the Kellogg standard, which grants both the employer and
employee a benefit from the exclusion, was properly generated by a legislative
intent analysis through an application of both the formalist and realist
approaches to statutory analysis.
However, the Kellogg standard assumes the application of the donning and
doffing exclusion in Section 203(o) is disconnected from the activity itself and
leaves open the examination of the nature of the activity for any subsequent
Portal-to-Portal Act claims. 99 Devoid of a clear analysis of the interplay
between Section 203(o) and the Portal-to-Portal Act or a definitive rule for the
principal nature of excluded changing and washing, the Kellogg ruling does little
to solve the uncertainty created by the statute’s failure to mention the coverage
of travel time following excluded changing and washing time.100 As a result, the
ambiguity created by the Kellogg court over whether an activity has to be
compensated to qualify as a principal activity has come under attack by the
Seventh Circuit, which requires compensation for an activity to be principal in
nature.101
B. The Sandifer Test: Placing Economic Theories Above Established
Jurisprudence
The Sandifer test enunciated by Judge Posner conflicts with well-established
Portal-to-Portal Act jurisprudence. In his decision, Judge Posner struggled with
the notion that an uncompensated activity could ever be principal in nature and
trigger the start of the continuous workday. 102 Judge Posner justified this

97. See Franklin v. Kellogg, 619 F.3d 604, 619 (6th Cir. 2010).
98. See Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 598 (7th Cir. 2012), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 870
(2014).
99. See Kellogg, 619 F.3d at 619 (concluding that whether an activity is principal does not
depend on its compensability, and therefore the court must consider whether the activity is an
“integral and indispensible” part of the employee’s job).
100. See Sandifer, 678 F.3d at 598 (explaining that the Kellogg court did not explain its
reasoning for deeming a noncompensable activity a principal activity).
101. See id.
102. Id. at 596. Judge Posner explained that it is illogical to hold that an uncompensated
activity can be an “integral and indispensible” activity because employees are required to do many
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assertion by engaging in an economic analysis grounded in law and economics
theory.103 In his view, granting compensation for travel time following excluded
donning and doffing activity would create a new, economically destructive
minimum standard which would either be offset by the employer through lower
wages or layoffs.104
This view, while considered the majority approach for economic analysis, is
not without opposition.105 Several contemporary economic scholars believe that
minimum economic standards are not economically destructive, but instead
constitute a policy decision with little to no economic effect.106 One such view
theorizes that although labor markets appear competitive, in a broad sense they

things for which they are not compensated. Id. As part of this explanation, Judge Posner
differentiated between tasks an employee is employed to do and tasks that are required as
tangentially necessary, such as showing up for work and calling in sick, noting, for example, that
employees are not compensated for the time they spend on the phone to call in sick. Id.
103. Id. at 597.
104. Id. Judge Posner explained that compensating employees for travel time would impose
higher costs on employers that would ultimately be transferred to employees through lower wages.
Id. He reasoned that by compensating employees for the time they spent traveling would result in
employees doing less productive work during the specified eight-hour shift than was done
previously, thereby causing employers to lower wages in compensation or to impose restrictions
limiting travel time, which can also translate in to lower wages. Id. However, Judge Posner’s
hypothesis ignores the legal regime of unionized workplaces. And, would his hypothesis occur, it
would not necessarily be an evil to be corrected since Congress, in enacting the National Labor
Relations Act, put into place a national policy of collective bargaining and economic choice. 29
U.S.C. § 151 (2006 & 2012). As part of this regime, it is unlawful for an employer to make changes
to the wages, hours, and working conditions covered by a collective bargaining agreement without
first bargaining with the union. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) and (d). Therefore, if in a union workplace
an employer and union bargained to offset a gain from an increase in minimum standards through
other economic provisions, then the employer and the union engaged in conduct that is explicitly
endorsed under the National Labor Relations Act.
105. See, e.g., David Card & Alan B. Kreuger, Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case
Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania: Reply, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 1397,
1398 (2000) (concluding that the 1992 increase in New Jersey’s minimum wage did not decrease
the overall number of fast-food workers in the state); Bruce E. Kaufman, Institutional Economics
and the Minimum Wage: Broadening the Theoretical and Policy Debate, 63 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REV. 427, 427–28 (2010) (arguing that minimum standards are necessary policy choices that may
have positive effects on employment); Lawrence F. Katz & Alan B. Kreuger, The Effect of the New
Minimum Wage Law in a Low Wage Labor Market 7–9 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 3655, 1991) (asserting that many low-wage employers ignored the rule allowing them to
pay below-minimum wages to youth workers and that many of the employers whose paid wages
above the set minimum raised their wages even further to remain competitive in the marketplace);
David Neumark & William Wascher, Minimum Wages and Employment: A Review of Evidence
from the New Minimum Wage Research 5–6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
12663, 2006) (noting that although their research has shown negative trends in employment for
low-wage workers as a result of increased minimum wages, a significant amount of research shows
that no effect, a negligible effect, or even a positive effect on employment as a result of minimum
wage increases).
106. See Kaufman, supra note 105, at 427–28; Neumark & Wascher, supra note 105 at 5–6.
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heavily favor the employer due to the employer’s disguised market power.107
As a result, absent progressive social norms and labor policies, the supposedly
competitive labor market becomes inherently unequal.108
Additionally, Alan Krueger and David Card have studied the effects of a
minimum wage increase on employment in the New Jersey restaurant
industry. 109 The study reached the opposite conclusion of Judge Posner’s
economic assumptions, finding that instead of a decrease in New Jersey
employment post-wage increase, employment increased after the higher wage
was implemented. 110 While this study is not without critique, 111 two of the
criticizing economists performed their own empirical analysis of Krueger and
Card’s data and found that the although employment did not increase, the
negative effects of the minimum wage increase in Kreuger and Card’s study
were negligible.112
Nevertheless, Judge Posner promulgated a standard for travel time that
follows excluded donning and doffing activity that requires that the donning and
doffing activity be compensated in order to be principal in nature. 113 This
conclusion, however, complicates the application of Portal-to-Portal Act
jurisprudence and conflicts with decades of well-established law.

107. Kaufman, supra note 105, at 434, 437 (explaining that “labor markets are always and
everywhere imperfectly competitive”).
108. Id. at 438. The argument is based on the notion that employers and labor markets are, by
their nature, parasitic. See Steven L. Willborn, Individual Employment Rights and the Standard
Economic Objection: Theory and Empiricism, 67 NEB. L. REV. 101, 125–26 (1988) (arguing that
workers will not benefit from increases in minimum wage). This market failure forces societies to
consider the problem in terms of “choosing the appropriate social arrangement for dealing with
harmful effects” of the market failure. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON.
1, 18 (1960). Studies of world economics have shown that a more equal income distribution results
in greater economic growth. Kaufman, supra note 105, at 444. Therefore, pro-minimum standard
scholars conclude, higher wages do not negatively effect the distribution of wages within labor
markets, but instead are a solution to inequality in the marketplace that will result in greater
efficiency and market stabilization. Id. In other words, an established minimum term, like
compensation for travel time following a Section 203(o) activity that is a principal in nature will
offset this inequality by creating efficient terms across the entire labor market, which cannot be
rejected by an employer seeking to offset costs. See Willborn, supra, at 126.
109. David Card & Alan B. Krueger, Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the
Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 772, 792 (1994) (finding
that New Jersey fast-food employers expanded their work forces following the increase in the
minimum wage).
110. Id.
111. David Neumark & William Wascher, Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study
of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania: Comment, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 1362,
1362–63 (2000) (criticizing Card and Krueger’s study on the grounds that their data methodology
was flawed and that estimates based on a different data set comprised of payroll data suggested that
fast-food employment fell after the minimum wage increase).
112. Id.
113. Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 595–96 (7th Cir. 2012), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 870
(2014).
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The crux of Portal-to-Portal Act judicial interpretations is whether the activity
is principal in nature and should be compensated.114 If the reviewing court finds
that the nature of the activity is integral and indispensible to the employee’s job
duties, then the activity is principal in nature, and all the activities that follow
must be compensated.115 The analysis, however, does not require that an activity
be compensated to be principal, because determining whether compensation is
due is the purpose of the analysis. In contrast, Sandifer makes payment of
compensation a requirement for an activity to be a principal activity that can
trigger compensation for a continuous workday, in effect making compensation
a prerequisite to further compensation.116 The Sandifer test, therefore, frustrates
the application of decades of principal activity precedent.117
Since 1956, when the Supreme Court decided Steiner v. Mitchell, the
uniformly applied test for determining when an activity is principal in nature has
asked whether the activity is “integral and indispensible” to the performance of
the employee’s job duties.118 This test has been applied across the spectrum of
Portal-to-Portal Act cases.119 Recently, the Supreme Court also applied this test
114. See Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 255–56 (1956).
115. Id.
116. Sandifer, 678 F.3d at 596.
117. Posner’s analysis in Sandifer is in three parts: 1) is the donning and doffing activity
principal in nature and therefore capable of being excluded under Section 203(o); 2) did the union
and employer waive compensation for the principal donning and doffing activity in question; and
3) does the fact that the employer and union have decided to forego compensation for an otherwise
principal activity alter the nature of that donning and doffing. Id. Although Section 203(o)
excludes by agreement compensation for the time spent changing in and out of work clothes, there
is no indication that excluding compensation alters the principal status of that activity.
118. See Steiner, 350 U.S. at 255; see also supra note 73 (listing cases that have applied the
Steiner standard).
119. See, e.g., IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 37 (2005) (holding that, under the
Portal-to-Portal Act, “an activity that is ‘integral and indispensable’ to a ‘principal activity’ is itself
a ‘principal activity’”); Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 738–39 (1981)
(explaining that courts should consider whether an activity is integral and indispensible to the
principal activity in analyzing whether compensation is due); Mitchell v. King Packing Co., 350
U.S. 260, 263 (1956) (finding that knife-sharpening is integral and indispensible to principal
butchering activities and therefore must be compensated); Perez v. Mountaine Farms, Inc., 650
F.3d 350, 363 (4th Cir. 2011) (applying the integral and indispensible test); Bamonte v. City of
Mesa, 598 F.3d 1217, 1221–22 (9th Cir. 2010) (same); Pirant v. U.S. Postal Serv., 542 F.3d 202,
208 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that because a worker’s donning and doffing activities were not
integral and indispensible to any principal activity, the actions were not compensable); De Ascensio
v. Tysons Foods, Inc., 500 F.3d 361, 371 (3d Cir. 2007) (adopting the integral and indispensible
test in deciding whether donning and doffing is compensable); Bonilla v. Baker Concrete Constr.,
Inc., 487 F.3d 1340, 1344 (11th Cir. 2007) (applying the integral and indispensible test to determine
if compensation was due for required security screening and employer-provided transportation);
Bienkowski v. Northeastern Univ., 285 F.3d 138, 140–41 (1st Cir. 2002); Adams v. Alcoa, Inc.,
822 F. Supp. 2d 156, 160 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that the time spent by employees in EMT
training was not integral and indispensible to a principal activity and therefore was not
compensable); Wright v. Pulaski Cnty., No. 4:09CV00065 SWW, 2010 WL 3328015, at *4 (E.D.
Ark. Aug. 24, 2010) (noting that because workers can don and doff uniforms at home these
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in determining that the required donning and doffing of work clothes may be
principal in nature.120 Before the recent Section 203(o) cases, the courts never
required that an activity be compensated in order to be principal in nature.121
Instead, courts have reached the antithetical result; requiring compensation only
if an activity is principal in nature.122
Aside from the jurisprudential issues of the Sandifer standard, the legislative
history of Section 203(o) referenced in the Sandifer opinion clearly states that
Congress designed the exclusion to allow unions and employers to bargain away
compensation for donning and doffing time.123 The legislative history makes no
mention of the union and employer being able to bargain over, or change, the
nature of the activity.124 Congress was well aware of the continuous workday
rule when it debated and passed the Section 3(o) exclusion. 125 If Congress
intended for Section 203(o) to alter the nature of the activity, they would have
explicitly stated so.126 That Congress did not intend or foresee the use of Section
3(o) exclusions waiving the nature of job activities lends further support for
denouncing Judge Posner’s analysis.127
As a result, future courts should reject the Sandifer test as incompatible with
the current authority on and legislative history of the Portal-to-Portal Act. Since
the passage of the Portal-to-Portal Act, courts have looked to the nature of the
activity when deciding whether the time spent in the activity should be
compensated.128 Instead of taking a step towards closing the divide in authority,
Judge Posner’s approach created additional uncertainties that are contrary to
well-established law.129
activities are not integral and indispensible and thus not compensable); Andrako v. U.S. Steel Corp.,
632 F. Supp. 2d 398, 406 (W.D. Pa. 2009) (applying the integral and indispensable test); Martin v.
City of Richmond, 504 F. Supp. 2d 766, 776–77 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (same).
120. Alvarez, 546 U.S. at 29.
121. For the current Portal-to-Portal Act analysis, which requires an examination of the nature
of the activity, see supra Part I.
122. See supra notes 112–13.
123. See Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 597–98 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing the
preamble to the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. § 251(a) (2006)), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 870 (2014). Judge
Posner’s analysis of the legislative history focuses on the Portal-to-Portal Act’s purpose of avoiding
judicial windfalls for employees gained by large, unexpected costs on employers. See id. This
analysis, however, ignores several key aspects of the legislative history. Nowhere in the legislative
history is there any mention of an employer and union being able to change the nature of the activity
being performed, nor does it address the history of Section 203(o), which focused instead on
waiving compensation to preserve collective-bargaining agreements.
124. Instead, the focus is on preserving collective bargaining agreements that make certain
activities uncompensated. See supra Part II.A.
125. The continuous workday rule has long been an established part of employment law
jurisprudence. See 95 CONG. REC. 11210 (1949) (statement of Rep. Christian Herter).
126. See supra note 88.
127. See supra Part I (discussing the FLSA and Portal-to-Portal Act).
128. See, e.g., Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 256 (1956); see also supra note 113.
129. See infra Part III.
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III. ADOPTING A NEW STANDARD: THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 203(O)
SHOULD PROVIDE CERTAINTY AND FAIRNESS IN THE BARGAINING PROCESS.
Because of the continuing divide in Section 203(o) jurisprudence, the courts
should create a definitive rule for the compensability of travel time following
excluded donning and doffing.
Numerous bargaining units have a
hard-negotiated history of agreements that place the beginning of the
compensated workday at the time employees commence productive work at their
workstations.130 This bargaining history, however, has ignored the language and
intent of Section 203(o) for nearly seven decades and has led to protracted
litigation.
The text of the exclusion states that bona fide collective bargaining units may
exclude from compensation time spent in donning and doffing activities.131 This
raises the question: Why would the exclusion be applied if the donning and
doffing activity was not a principal activity and thus, not compensable?
Therefore, the courts should adopt a standard that holds any valid application of
the exclusion, either through express contractual language or assertion by the
court following a finding of custom and past practices, is a per se principal
activity that triggers compensation for a continuous workday.
A. The Principles of Collective Bargaining Support the Proposed Standard
At its core, Section 203(o) is a collective bargaining statute.132 Therefore, the
recommended standard to resolve the current authoritative conflict regarding
130. See, e.g., Agreement By and Between Washington Employers, Inc. and International
Brotherhood of Boilermakers Local No. 104, at 2 (Dec. 13, 2006), available at
http://www.dol.gov/olms/regs/compliance/cba/private/cbrp_2280_pri.pdf
(establishing
the
workday in Article VI); Collective Bargaining Agreement Between D’Agostino Supermarkets Inc.
and Local 1500, U.F.C.W., at 3 (Sept. 11, 2005), available at http://www.dol.gov/olms/regs
/compliance/cba/pdf/cbrp0594.pdf (“Except for part-time employees, forty (40) hours shall
constitute the regular work week for all employees covered herein, and it shall consist of five (5)
eight (8) hour days.”); C.f. Collective Bargaining Agreement Between SNE Enterprises, Inc. and
Midwestern Council of Industrial Workers of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of
America, at 16 (Mar. 29, 2004), available at http://www.dol.gov/olms/regs/compliance
/cba/pdf/cbrp1897.pdf (outlining the procedures for the assignment of overtime but not defining a
standard workday).
131. 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2006).
132. See 95 CONG. REC. 11210 (1949) (statement of Rep. Christian Herter). The legislative
history of the FLSA makes it clear that, even though the statute was enacted to alleviate inequality
and set minimum standards for all American workers, there was no intention to disrupt private
sector collective bargaining. See PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT, ADDRESS OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES DELIVERED BEFORE A JOINT SESSION OF THE TWO HOUSES
OF CONGRESS, in H.R. DOC. NO. 75-458, at 4 (Jan. 3, 1938). While debating the FLSA in 1938,
President Roosevelt stated that, although the FLSA should address the reality of the unorganized
workforce, the statute was not intended to interfere with the national labor policy of collective
bargaining. Id. In fact, in an address to Congress he specifically recognized the importance of
collective bargaining when determining pay for hours worked by employees. Id. This was repeated
by senior officials within the Roosevelt administration, when then-Attorney General Robert H.
Jackson testified to Congress that the “[FLSA] gives effect to collective bargaining.” Fair Labor
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travel time following Section 203(o) activity should be examined alongside the
principles of collective bargaining.
Collective bargaining is “a continuous, dynamic, institutional process for
solving problems arising directly out of the employer-employee relationship.”133
In application, many see collective bargaining as a way by which employees
exert unified pressure to obtain higher wages and better benefits from their
employers.134 Thus, an agreement born from the bargaining process acts as a
check on the “prerogatives of an unrestrained management.” 135 Simply put,
collective bargaining is a set of economic choices made collectively by the
employer and the union.
1. The Nature of Collective Bargaining Requires Certainty of the Legal
Effects of Section 203(o)
Because collective bargaining is a set of economic exchanges, there must be
certainty regarding the effects of applying Section 203(o) or else the bargaining
parties may be unwilling to apply it. 136 If there is no certainty, union and
employer may force themselves into continuous arbitration over the meaning of
the exclusion as applied to their bargaining unit.137 This will result in parties
Standards Act of 1937: Joint Hearing on S. 2475 and H.R. 7200 Before the S. Comm. on Education
and Labor and the H. Comm. on Labor, 75th Cong. 22 (1937) (statement of Robert H. Jackson,
Att’y General of the United States). It is well established that collective bargaining cannot serve
to eliminate the minimum standards set by the FLSA. See, e.g., Brooklyn Bank v. O’Neil,324 U.S.
697, 704 (1945) (holding that “[w]here a private right is granted in the public interest to effectuate
a legislative policy, waiver of a right so charged or colored with the public interest will not be
allowed where it would thwart the legislative policy which it was designed to effectuate.”); see also
Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981) (citing Brooklyn Sav. Bank v.
O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704 (1945)) (stating in dicta that because the Supreme Court has repeatedly
emphasized that the right to a minimum wage and overtime pay is nonwaivable, “FLSA rights
cannot be abridged by contract or otherwise waived because this would ‘nullify the purposes’ of
the statute and thwart the legislative policies it was designed to effectuate.”). The FLSA, however,
does allow union employees to waive minimum compensation for changing and washing time. 29
U.S.C. § 203(o); see also Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 254–55 (1956) (discussing 29 U.S.C.
§ 203(o)). But, nowhere in the text or history of the amendment is there any indication that Congress
also intended for this waiver to apply to the nature of the activity thus affecting the structure of the
workday outside of changing and washing time.
133. HAROLD W. DAVEY ET AL, CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 4 (Dale Yoder
ed., 2d ed. 1959). The term is believed to be originally conceived by Sidney and Beatrice Webb.
Id.; see SIDNEY WEBB & BEATRICE WEBB, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 173 n.1 (1897).
134. David E. Feller, A Theory of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 663,
720 (1973).
135. Id. at 721.
136. See Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104 (1962) (“Indeed, the
existence of possibly conflicting legal concepts might substantially impede the parties’ willingness
to agree to contract terms providing for final arbitral or judicial resolution of disputes.”).
137. Without a doubt, some collective bargaining agreement provisions will have ambiguities
that need to be resolved through arbitration or by the courts. These processes, however, should not
interpret ambiguities in a way that discourages concerted activity, but instead should foster the
public goals of collective bargaining. Thus disputes over the meaning of a contract terms are the
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refusing to agree to apply Section 203(o) exclusions to avoid guesswork and
high administrative costs.
In contrast, the test recommended herein creates certainty in application of the
exclusion. Whether the exclusion results from agreement or custom, the
proposed standard creates an irrefutable presumption that the activity is principal
in nature, and that any subsequent travel time is compensable.
2. Any Viable Standard Must Ensure Fairness Between the Bargaining
Parties.
Labor organizations advance the interests of the workers in the bargaining unit
by “regulat[ing] terms and conditions of employment and the relations between
[labor and management].”138 For example, the union may bargain away a dollarper-hour raise to gain improved safety standards or a higher pension
contribution. The employer, in turn, may seek to set off any extra costs or
benefits achieved by the union through other means. But for a Section 203(o)
exclusion to remain effective in the bargaining process, it needs to be applied
fairly and must avoid unduly rewarding or penalizing one party.139
By altering the nature of the activity, the Sandifer standard penalizes the union
and gives an extra benefit to the employer by expanding the scope of the waived
activity to also include subsequent travel time. 140 In contrast, the proposed
standard ensures fairness in the application of the exclusion. If an employer and
the union choose to waive compensation for Section 203(o) activity, then the
waiver would do just that and nothing more. 141 Applying the exclusion in a
proper subject matter of arbitration. See, e.g., U.S. Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S.
564, 568 (1960) (stating that when an agreement is covered by an arbitration clause, courts presume
that a dispute over the agreement is covered by the clause and should be settled in arbitration). The
overwhelming majority of collective bargaining agreements contain arbitration clauses, which
would require any dispute between the union and employer over the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement to be settled through an arbitration process. See Feller, supra note 129 at 747.
138. Bernard Gernigon, Alberto Odero & Horacio Guido, ILO Principles Concerning
Collective Bargaining, 139 INT’L LABOUR L. REV. 33, 51 (2000), available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/revue/download/pdf/gernigon.pdf.
139. Gary Chartier, Sweatshops, Labor Rights, and Competitive Advantage, 10 OR. REV. INT’L
L. 149, 160 (2008) (“It is thus appropriate for the law to shape bargaining situations and contractual
terms to prevent exploitation and coercion.”); Eleanor Holmes Norton, Bargaining and the Ethic
of Process, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 562 (1989) (asserting that the Taft-Hartley Act, and thus
collective bargaining, “strengthened the ethical values of truthfulness and fairness in collective
bargaining.”).
140. The standard in Sandifer will result in the employer not only achieving a waiver of
compensation for the Section 203(o) activity, but also every activity performed by the employee up
until the moment the employee begins productive work at their work station. See Sandifer v. U.S.
Steel Corp., 678 F.3d 590, 592 (7th Cir. 2012), aff’d 134 S. Ct. 870 (2014). In contrast, the members
of the bargaining unit, who presumably bargained away compensation for the changing time will
lose compensation beyond the scope of the waiver. See id. This unbalances the bargaining process
and thus could undermine the effectiveness of Section 203(o) exclusions.
141. The Kellogg framework will ensure that the only compensation bargained away is for the
Section 203(o) activity. See Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604 (6th Cir. 2010). This maintains
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balanced and limited manner combined with the principle that labor unions
inherently protect the interests of their workers demonstrates that courts should
apply the proposed standard in order to preserve fairness in the bargaining
process.
B. The Economic Choice of Collective Bargaining Supports the Proposed
Standard
In Sandifer, the Seventh Circuit panel expressed doubt that interpreting
Section 203(o) activity as principal in nature would be seen merely as an illusory
gain in wages because doing so would set a new minimum employment
standard, which would be offset by the employer.142 This theory, based on a law
and economics analysis, 143 ignores the economic realities of unionized
workplaces.144 Section 203(o) can only be applied to unionized workplaces.145
Any of the potential employer offsets to maintain economic equilibrium that the
Seventh Circuit was concerned about are not certain to occur.146 Employers that
wish to offset the compensation for travel time must bargain with the union

balance as the benefit achieved by the employer does not result in compensation that is outside the
scope of the waiver and that the employee would otherwise be entitled to. See id.
142. Recording of Oral Argument, Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 678 f.3d 590 (2012) (Nos.
10-1821, 10-1866), available at http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/MA0XB9JY.mp3; see also
Willborn, supra note 101, at 114 (“Because imposition of minimal terms is the equivalent of a wage
increase and because an exogenous wage increase reduces the demand for labor, any benefits to
workers from minimum terms in the short run are paid for by other workers in unemployment.”).
143. An economic analysis of the law focuses on the reciprocal nature of economic harm. In
other words, assuming that two economic actors are in perfect competition then any harm inflicted
by one actor on another will be accompanied by an equal amount of harm on the inflicting actor.
See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1960) (summarizing the nature
of reciprocal economic harm).
144. Unlike non-union workplaces, union employers are subject to numerous restrictions on
the actions that they can take without the consent of the union. See infra note 141 (discussing these
employer restrictions).
145. Section 203(o) excludes “any time spent in changing clothes or washing at the beginning
or end of each workday . . . by the express terms of or by custom or practice under a bona fide
collective bargaining agreement.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (2006). Therefore, only unionized
employees can exclude the compensation for changing time from their workday. See id.
146. Section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) establishes the employer’s
obligation to bargain with the recognized union regarding “wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA labels any failure
to fulfill the obligation to bargain in good faith as an unfair labor practice. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5).
Courts have interpreted this provision to prohibit unilateral modification of contract terms
contained in a collective bargaining agreement. See Milwaukee Spring Div. of Ill. Coil Spring Co.,
268 N.L.R.B. 601, 601 (1984), aff’d sub nom, UAW v. NLRB, 764 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
Additionally, the courts have interpreted Section 8(a)(5) to prohibit unilateral modification of
contract terms made to wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of employment when the terms
are not contained in the collective bargaining agreement. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962).
As a result, there is a strong regulatory regime that stops unionized employers from enacting the
very changes that concern the Seventh Circuit without first consulting with the union.
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before doing so.147 Therefore, the employer and the union must agree to any
economic offset due to new compensation for travel time.
The United States has a national labor policy of collective bargaining.148 The
government encourages employers and unions to settle the very conflicts that
the Seventh Circuit identified.149 In line with this policy, the courts should not
assume a theoretical result of collective bargaining. Instead, courts should
recognize the minimum standards required by the FLSA, including required
compensation for travel time following a principal activity, and invite collective
bargaining over any remaining terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
IV. CONCLUSION
The current authoritative split regarding Section 203(o) activity is both
damaging to employee compensation and in conflict with decades of
Portal-to-Portal Act jurisprudence. This conflict has the potential to frustrate the
very purpose of Section 203(o)—preserving collective bargaining agreements.
Therefore, the Supreme Court should adopt a new, definitive standard that
creates certainty, ensures fairness, and recognizes the economic choice of
collective bargaining.
The proposed standard does just that. If a unionized employer wish to employ
the Section 203(o) exclusion, they must also recognize that they are endorsing
the donning and doffing as a per se principal activity that triggers compensation
for the continuous workday. This standard will allow the parties to bargain
vigorously over the use of Section 203(o) but not extend the exclusion beyond
the original scope enunciated by Congress or the bargaining parties.

147. Katz, 369 U.S. at 743.
148. 29 U.S.C. § 151.
149. Id.
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